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Approach 
Background 
What is nuclear terrorism? 
What does the UN say about the threat it poses? 
Is this an overstatement? 
Why? 
Questions. 
 
Background 
The science is conceptually quite ‘simple’ 
Uranium is found in many places across the world. In its natural 
form (Uranium 238), it is stable. 
U-238 represents about 99.3% of all natural uranium and, frankly, is 
rubbish for making a bomb. 
0.7% of natural uranium is U-235 which is the good stuff. 
Luckily for bomb-makers and power-plant operators, U-238 can 
be enriched to U-235, which is fissionable.  
It is the same science for both processes, but whereas uranium 
for reactors is enriched to between 3-4% U-235 (Low Enriched 
Uranium, LEU), that which goes into weapons is enriched to 
around 90% U-235 (Highly Enriched Uranium, HEU) 
Once you have HEU, you can make a bomb. 
BUT, if you have more than about 50kg of HEU in the same 
place, it will start to react, and then explode. 
Most basic bombs are of the fission type (there are some 2-stage 
thermonuclear designs, but they are may to complicated to 
explain here) 
The basic designs are “Gun-type” and “implosion-type”… 
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In the Gun-type bomb, two pieces of sub-critical HEU (HEU which 
is too small to start an explosion) are held apart in the bomb 
case. 
A conventional (chemical) explosion is triggered which pushes 
one piece of HEU into the other at high speed, at which point the 
chain reaction starts, and the bomb explodes. 
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The principle in implosion-type bombs is the same, but the 
design means that the sub-critical piece of HEU is compressed 
into criticality. It is a lot more cumbersome than the Gun-type 
design. 
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1kg TNT used as  scale for 
most explosions. 
The pressure wave quickly  
dies off, the further you 
are away from the 
explosion* 
Even so, 20psi (the peak 
overpressure felt 1m from 
the explosion), is 
equivalent to over 880kg 
on a piece of A4 paper 
On 16th July 1945, US Government scientists, working under the 
direction of J Robert Oppenheimer, detonated an implosion-
design plutonium bomb which had the explosive power of 
20,000,000 kg of TNT (20kt – kilotons) 
If you were to stand 1m from the point of explosion, you would 
feel the equivalent of 400 million psi. this is equivalent to 280m 
tons per square metre. Luckily, the pressure wave wouldn’t 
matter, as the radioactive fireball would have killed you 
immediately. 
The most powerful nuclear weapon ever developed was the 
Soviet Union’s RDS-220 “Tsar Bomba” hydrogen bomb, with a 
1961 test-yield of 50 megatons (50,000kt, or 2,500 times more 
powerful than Trinity) – it had the capacity for 100mt, but was 
too expensive 
TRINITY NUCLEAR TEST 
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16 JULY 1945 
The largest US bomb was the Mk41/B41 3-stage thermonuclear 
device, with a yield of ‘only’ 25mt in the late 1960s 
The downside of these huge weapons was partly their size (the 
RDS-220 was 8 metres long, and the B41 weighed 4,800 kg) and 
partly their cost (some estimates put the cost of Trinity as $2bn - 
$25bn today) 
The trend in the 1960s and 1970s moved away from small 
numbers of massive warheads, to larger numbers of smaller 
warheads, which were cheaper, lighter, more targetable (and got 
round the SALT I Treaty provisions, which only covered missiles, 
not warheads) 
NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES 
Country 1st test 
USA 1942 
USSR/Russia* 1949 
UK 1952 
China 1964 
France 1969 
Defined in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons (NPT) 1968 as those countries which are allowed to 
possess nuclear weapons 
NUCLEAR ARMED STATES (NON-NPT) 
Country 1st Test / Status 
India 1974 
Israel 1979 (Refuses to admit or deny) 
Pakistan 1998 
North Korea 2010 
Iran Denies weapons programme 
Syria Accused by US and Israel only 
South Africa Dismantled nuclear weapons in 1994 
States which “which have developed nuclear weapons outside the 
framework of the treaty” (McDonnell, 2013:62) 
At the peak of the Cold War, there were close to 80,000 nuclear 
warheads controlled by the nuclear states (almost 95% by 
USA/USSR)*. 
Estimated total explosive power was around 40,000mt or two 
million times more than the Trinity test. 
The Strategic Arms Limitation Treaties SALT 1 (1972) and SALT 
II (1979) cut the numbers being produced  by the US and USSR. 
The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties START I (1991) and 
START II (2000) and Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty SORT 
(2002) aimed to reduce the number of strategic operational 
warheads to under 1,700-2,200 on each side (though both also 
have non-deployed non-strategic weapons) 
At present (updated 18 December 2012)*, the Federation of 
American Scientists claims there are 4,100 operational strategic 
and c200 operational non-strategic warheads globally. 
 
This is A Good Thing (it is also 700 fewer strategic warheads than 
this time last year) 
 
The FAS also say that there are still 17,500 weapons in existence, 
but the extra ones are in storage etc. Even if the figure of 17,500 
is a little high, it still means that almost 65,000 warheads have 
been removed from use. 
 
This is also A Good Thing 
BUT… 
Where have they all gone? 
Some have been dismantled, several thousand are (in the 
language of the FAS, “awaiting dismantlement”) and the 
plutonium and (HEU) from Russia is being bought by the United 
States. 
Partly to fuel its own atomic programme, but also to keep the 
substances from “falling into the wrong hands” 
What is Nuclear Terrorism? 
Direct Air Attack: 
In November 1972, a Southern Airways Dakota DC-9 was 
hijacked and a demand of $2 million was made.  The 
hijackers circled the Oak Right National Laboratory in 
Tennessee and threatened to crash the DC-9 into the nuclear 
reactor there unless they received the money.* 
Bombing: 
Between 1973 and 1975, there were attacks on at least three 
nuclear reactors. 
On 18 January 1982, a small group operating under the 
banner of the Organisation of Arab Armed Struggle and led by 
Ilyich Ramirez Sanchez,** launched an attack on an 
incomplete reactor on the Rhone valley in central France.  The 
attack, using an ex-Soviet RPG-7 Rocket Launcher, failed.*** 
Pakistan has had nuclear weapons for over a decade, although 
the programme has been going since the 1970s. 
Has c60 nuclear warheads, although the numbers are secret (but 
estimates put it as high as 200). 
The US (and others) fear that the rise of the Taliban in the North-
West Frontier / Swat area of Pakistan puts the nuclear missiles at 
risk. 
How will the world react to Taliban-controlled weapons? 
US has not ruled out a pre-emptive military strike against the 
missile locations… 
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Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan (AQ Khan) founded Pakistan’s nuclear 
programme in 1976 
In 2004, he admitted selling secrets about nuclear weapons 
technology to governments in Iran, Libya and North Korea. 
There were allegations a the time that his actions were 
sanctioned by the Pakistan government, but they strenuously 
denied this. 
He was released from house arrest in 2009, but is still forbidden 
to talk to foreign journalists. 
 
Most reports like to deal with the threat of full-blown Nuclear 
terrorism alongside other WMD – Chemical, Biological and 
Radiological. 
This allows for reports like the December 2008 “World at Risk” 
report from the Commission on the Prevention of WMD 
Proliferation and Terrorism to say things like 
“[we] believe that unless the world community acts decisively and 
with great urgency, it is more likely than not that a weapon of mass 
destruction will be used in a terrorist attack somewhere in the world 
by the end of 2013.” (p. xv) 
They do admit, however that:  
“[we] further believe that terrorists are more likely to be able to 
obtain and use a biological weapon than a nuclear weapon” (p. xv)  
What does the UN say about the 
threat it poses? 
1986 
Report of the International Task Force on the Prevention of 
Nuclear Terrorism 
“… the interest of terrorists and, as the case may be, their 
sponsors in acquiring nuclear weapons should be regarded as 
technically, politically and psychologically plausible” 
 
 
 
2005 
Porter Goss, Director, Central Intelligence Agency (Testimony 
before the US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence): 
“There is sufficient material unaccounted for [in Russia], so that it 
would be possible for those with know-how to construct a nuclear 
weapon.” 
UN General Assembly adopts (by consensus) the International 
Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. 
Convention makes it an offence for a person who: 
“possesses radioactive material or makes or possesses a device 
with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury or to cause 
substantial damage to property or to the environment” 
2007 
George F Russell, Jr, EastWest Institute: 
“There is no counter-terrorism goal more important for protecting 
people than the fight to prevent nuclear terrorism” 
Paul Cornish, Chatham House: 
“The risk of terrorist use of nuclear weapons, as traditionally 
calculated, could scarcely be higher. For Western governments 
the risk is of such a magnitude that worst-case analysis seems 
not only unavoidable but also appropriate” 
 
 
2012 
US President Barack Obama (speech to Nunn-Luger 
Cooperative Threat Reduction Symposium:  
“I continue to believe that nuclear terrorism remains one of the 
greatest threats to global security… That’s why working to 
prevent nuclear terrorism is going to remain one of my top 
national security priorities as long as I have the privilege of being 
President of the United States” 
Seoul Communiqué, 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit: 
“Nuclear terrorism continues to be one of the most challenging 
threats to international security” 
 
 
Is this an overstatement? 
Yes. 
1. Science. 
Creation and storage of a nuclear bomb takes specialist 
knowledge. Some terrorist groups may have access to this 
knowledge. 
 
 
Yes. 
2. Access 
Purchase of enriched radioactive material takes: 
a) Large sums of money. Some terrorist groups have access 
to the kinds of funds needed. The IAEA says there was 
one reported incidence of attempted sale of HEU in 2011 
b) Enough enriched radioactive material to achieve criticality. 
In history, not enough of this type of material has been 
lost or stolen 
Illicit Trafficking Database (ITDB) set up by the IAEA in 1995 to: 
“record and analyse incidents of illicit trafficking in nuclear and other 
radioactive material. It incorporates all incidents in which nuclear 
and other radioactive material out of regulatory control” 
 
 
Incidences reported to ITDB involving unauthorized possession of 
radioactive material and related criminal activities, 1993-2011. 
 
 
Yes. 
3. Impact 
Even if there was a nuclear detonation, however spectacular it 
might be, it would not destroy a city, let alone a civilisation. 
Joe Cirincione (President of the Ploughshares Fund) claimed 
the nuclear stockpile could “destroy the world, several times 
over” (Mueller, 2010:18) 
Physicist John McPhee pointed out, however, that: 
“the largest bomb that has ever been exploded anywhere was sixty 
megatons, and that is 1/1000 of the force of an earthquake, 1/1000 of 
the force of a hurricane” (1974:5) 
4. International Treaties and Conventions 
 
 
UN Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 1968 
Not strictly speaking a Treaty relating to Nuclear Terrorism, but 
one which nevertheless relates to the spread of nuclear weapons. 
Article 1: 
Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes 
not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons 
or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such 
weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly… 
Designed to halt the spread of nuclear weapons to countries 
which had not yet developed them, which at the time was the 
whole world bar the UK, US, USSR, and China. 
UN Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material 1980 
Didn’t enter into force until 1987 as many countries delayed in 
ratification. Scope is mainly the security during the transport of 
nuclear material 
Preamble: 
DESIRING to avert the potential dangers posed by the 
unlawful taking and use of nuclear material; 
CONVINCED that offences relating to nuclear material are a 
matter of grave concern and that there is an urgent need to 
adopt appropriate and effective measures to ensure the 
prevention, detection and punishment of such offences 
Annexes give the level of protection each type of material needs 
(over 5kg of U-235 warrants the highest level protection) 
 
 
 
UN Convention for the Suppression of Act of Nuclear Terrorism 
2005 has had a further attempt at clarifying the situation. 
Art 1.2 of the Convention defined “nuclear material” as: 
“Plutonium, except that with isotopic concentration exceeding 80% 
in P238; U233; uranium enriched in the isotope 235 or 233; uranium 
containing the mixture of isotopes as occurring in nature other than 
in the form of ore or ore residue; or any material containing one or 
more of the foregoing.” 
It is a “prosecute or extradite” Convention, as are most of the UN 
Counter Terrorism Conventions 
 
Why do they do it? 
Fear is useful as a way of building political support. 
Professor Phillip Morrison, Cornell University, 1946 
“We have a chance to build a working peace on the novelty and 
terror of the atomic bomb” 
Professor Paul Boyer, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1985 
“The strategy of manipulating fear to build support for political 
resolution of the atomic menace helped fix certain basic perceptions 
about the bomb” 
Diversion from more likely, but less dramatic types of terrorism?. 
“Rogue States” – how likely are Iran, North Korea, Syria(?) to: 
a) Develop 
b) Test and 
c) Use in anger 
“Radiological Terrorism” 
In 1996, “Chechen rebels left a substantial quantity of caesium-
137 wrapped in conventional explosive, in Izmailovo Park in 
Moscow. The device was not detonated.”* 
Since no nuclear power stations exist in Chechnya, it is most 
likely that this radioactive material was stolen, either from the 
closest reactor, in Armenia, or elsewhere in the Former Soviet 
Union 
Radiological Terrorism can be (wrongly) thought of as nuclear 
terrorism-lite 
The “dirty bomb” (radiological dispersal device / RDD) is 
effectively a conventional bomb, of whatever size you choose to 
make it (from a waistcoat to a truck), packed around with 
radioactive material. 
Not a new idea – Hitler had plans to drop a radiological bomb on 
Manhattan in 1944, but didn’t have the delivery vehicle capability 
 
Radioactive material is available very easily from: 
CD player 
DVD player 
PC/Laptop 
Air conditioning units 
Smoke detectors 
The death toll from an RDD will initially be no larger than that 
from the same size conventional bomb, but radioactive particles 
will be released into the atmosphere, heightening the risks of 
various types of cancer in the population. 
“the pure terror weapon” 
Can also use radioactive material for assassinations – Polonium-
210 and Alexander Litvinenko. 
The US-based Health Physics Society has created a Dispersal 
Devices Subcommittee specifically to deal with the threat. 
They list 3 types of RDD: 
A high energy radioactive source strapped to the bottom of a park 
bench, or left in a busy public location. 
Low probability; significant health risk to small numbers; easy 
detection & remediation; low psychosocial impact.  
A radioactive liquid dispersed from a moving vehicle or into a body 
of water 
Low probability; low/moderate health impact; hard to detect; 
can be significant psychosocial impact. 
A conventional explosive used to disperse radioactive material across 
a target area also known as a Dirty Bomb 
High probability; low health impact (after initial explosion); easy 
detection, significant psychosocial impact. 
Summary 
The SIS (MI6) states that they assist the Government in: 
Working to strengthen the international non-proliferation 
regime, and to dissuade states from acquiring, developing 
and contributing to the spread of Chemical, Biological, 
Radiological and Nuclear Weapons (CBRN). This includes 
their means of delivery and related material or expertise. 
Working to detect attempts by proliferator states and 
terrorists to develop or acquire CBRN weapons and their 
means of delivery.  
Recommendation: Dis-aggregate WMD. 
CBRN weapons do not pose, and never have, the same 
risks as each other. 
They would also not generate the same magnitude of 
event. 
 
Nuclear Weapons are dangerous, expensive, complicated and 
the material contained within them should be secure from 
theft, accident and act of nature. 
Nuclear Terrorism is one of the bogeymen of 21st Century – 
beloved of alarmists, politicians, Bond villains and the like. 
In reality, full-on nuclear terrorism will not occur. 
Is there a risk? Yes, an infinitesimally small risk, but one of 
great magnitude. 
Radiological terrorism, via RDD is not unlikely. Higher risk, 
lower impact. 
Focus on nuclear terrorism is a mistake, and I would argue 
that the UN should shift its focus onto RDD instead. 
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